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CASE NOTES
INSURANCE-ANTEDATED

POLICIES-ANTEDATED CONTRACT OF PROP-

ERTY INSURANCE MAY PROTECT AGAINST A Loss OCCURRING PRIOR

To

ISSUANCE OF THE POLICY, ABSENT FRAUD OR NEGLIGENT CONCEAL-

Burch v. Commonwealth County Mutual Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d
838 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
MENT.

Burch contacted an insurance salesman to obtain insurance on his
automobile. The salesman notified him that he was covered, but did
not specify a particular company. The salesman calculated the premium and accepted Burch's check. The following morning the salesman took the application to the general agent of the insurer. The
salesman was not an agent of the insurer; rather, he was acting on
behalf of Burch in procuring the policy. The general agent of the
insurer accepted the application, cashed the check, and mailed the
policy to Burch. The policy provided for antedated coverage from
12:01 a.m. of the previous day. Unknown to the salesman or to the
general agent, the automobile had been destroyed in a collision that
occurred after Burch had dealt with the salesman, but before the
salesman had procured the policy from the general agent. Burch had
tried to reach the salesman that morning to inform him of the collision,
but he was unable to do so until two or three days later. Although
the loss occurred within the stipulated policy period, the insurer sought
to cancel. Burch filed a cross-action for his damages. The trial court
granted Burch's motion for summary judgment, but the court of civil
appeals reversed' on the theory that an insurance policy may never
protect against a loss that occurred prior to the making of the contract.
Held-Reversed. An antedated contract of property insurance may
protect against a loss occurring prior to issuance of the policy, absent
fraud or negligent concealment.
Insurance that covers existing losses is well known in the field of
marine "lost or not lost" policies.2 At an early date, the validity of
promises to pay for existing losses was extended to the field of fire
insurance as well, when the policy was antedated and the loss occurred
3
between the date specified and the delivery of the policy. These early
1 Burch v. Commonwealth

County Mutual Ins. Co., 440 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-

Beaumont 1969), rev'd, 450 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
2 M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (I Peters) 170, 7 L. Ed. 98 (1828); Watson
v. Delafield, 3 N.Y. Com. L. R. 474 (N.Y. 1807); Andrews v. Marine Ins. Co., 4 N.Y.
Com. L. R. 656 (N.Y. Sup. 1811); Snow v. Mercantile Mut. Ins. Co., 61 N.Y. 160 (N.Y.
1874).
31Hallock v. Commercial Ins. Co., 26 N.J. 268 (1857); Collins v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 21
Sup. Ct. N.Y. 534 (N.Y. Sup. 1878).
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cases recognize that the basis of the insurance contract is risk.4 They
also recognize that this fundamental element is present when no loss
is known to have occurred. 5 Thus, the courts had no difficulty in holding the insurer liable, even though a loss had occurred prior to the
issuance of the policy,6 provided the loss was unknown to both parties.7
The risk was present in these cases because, as far as the parties knew,
a loss may or may not have already occurred.8 Thus, in the marine
cases, the insurer was bound to pay for the loss even though the ship
was lost prior to the issuance of the policy;9 and the insured was re-

quired to pay the premium, notwithstanding the ship had safely arrived
before the policy was issued. 10

In 1938 Justice Black helped extend the validity of antedated policies
into the general body of insurance law, when he observed that no legal
obstacle prevents parties, if they so desire, from entering into contract
of insurance to protect against losses that may have already occurred."

Such policies have since become widely recognized as being valid. 12

At an early date, it appeared that Texas would follow the weight of
authority in the United States. In Blake v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins.

Co.," Justice Gaines seemed to recognize that it is the knowledge of the

loss and not the fact of the loss that determines risk. In relieving a fire
insurance company of liability on an antedated contract, he stated:
It is not a case of two parties making a contract of insurance
upon property already lost, agreeing to date it from a past day;
4 Kline Bros. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 192 F. 378, 388 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1911); See also Matlock
v. Hollis, 109 P.2d 119, 132 A.L.R. 1325 (Kan. 1941).
5 Security Fire Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 70 Ky. 81 (1870).
6 Collins v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 21 Sup. Ct. N.Y. 534 (N.Y. Sup. 1878); Walker v. Lion
Fire Ins. Co., 34 A. 736 (Pa. 1896).
7 Wales v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 33 N.W. 322 (Minn. 1887); Continental
Casualty Co. v. Lanzisero, 181 A. 170 (N.J. App. 1935).
8 Security Fire Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Marine Fire Ins. Co., 70 Ky. 81 (1870).
9 Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 28 Mass. 227 (1831).
10 Bradford v. Symondson, L. R. 7 Q.B.D. 456 (1881).
11 United States v. Patryas, 303 U.S. 341, 345, 58 S. Ct. 551, 554, 82 L. Ed. 883, 886
(1938).
12 Cases recognizing the validity of antedated insurance contracts-M.F.S. Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Quinn, 295 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1953); Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Tacke, 257 F.2d
342 (9th Cir. 1958); National Indemnity Co. v. Smith-Gandy, Inc., 309 P.2d 742 (Wash.
1957); Pruitt v. Great American Ins. Co., 86 S.E.2d 401 (N.C. 1955); Ostroff v. Springfield
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 92 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1952); Ried v. Bankers Life Co., 28 N.W.2d 542
(Neb. 1947); Winecoff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 444 S.W.2d 84 (Tenn. 1969); St.
Julian v. Financial Indemnity Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 843 (Cal. App. 1969); Dixon v. Western
Union Assurance Co., 164 S.E.2d 214 (S.C. 1968); State Mutual Life Assurance Co. v.
Heine, 49 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Ky. 1943), afJ'd, 141 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1944).
Cases denying recovery on antedated contracts where the loss was known'to the insured-Matlock v. Hollis, 109 P.2d 119, 132 A.L.R. 1325 (Kan. 1941); Barry v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 81 A.2d 551 (Pa. 1951); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 112 So.2d 366
(Miss. 1959); Broome v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ass'n., 152 So.2d 827 (La. App. 1963);
Hunt v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 387 P.2d 405 (Colo. 1963); Arley v. United Pac.
Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1967).
18 67 Tex. 160, 2 S.W. 368 (1886).
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both being, at the date of the contract, ignorant of the loss.
When the notice was given, the fire was in progress, and the
appellants knew it.14
Perhaps the case that started Texas down the path of error was
Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society v. Dalton,'15 which contained
this statement:
Another elementary principle of the law of contracts applicable
to insurance is that the property must be in existence at the time
the policy is issued. As a corollary to this, the rights of the parties
are fixed at the time the property is destroyed. 16
The court relied on Blake as authority for this statement, but in so
doing, it failed to perceive the distinction between the fact of loss and
the knowledge of loss, which Judge Gaines had recognized.
If any doubt was created by this statement, it was resolved in a
most unfortunate manner in Alliance Ins. Co. v. Continental Gin.'7
Alliance turned on the question of whether an insured who knew of
an existing loss could ratify the unauthorized acts of an insurance agent.
The agent had cancelled the policies issued by one company and substituted the policies of another company. In relieving the second company of liability, the court paraphrased an opinion written by the
renowned Learned Hand in Kline Bros. & Co. v. Royal Ins. Co.18 Judge
Learned Hand was careful to draw the distinction between the fact
and the knowledge of the loss; but this was lost in the transition. 19
14 Blake v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 67 Tex. 160, 165, 2 S.W. 368, 371 (1886).

'5157
S.W. 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 213 S.W.
230 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).
16 Id. at 461.
17 285 S.W. 257 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted).
18 192 F. 378, 388 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1911).
19 Learned Hand, J.:
....
An insurer's undertaking is a promise to pay upon a given event which
either must happen in futuro, or if it have already happened must be still
unknown. Were it not so, the promise would be merely to pay a large sum of
money in consideration of a small one, which is an absurd intention to ascribe to
anyone. In the case at bar, since the loss happened before the policy became binding,
the promise could only be to pay for an existing loss. Such promises are common
enough in marine insurance . . . and they have been held to be binding in the case
of fire insurance when the policy was antedated and the loss occurred between the
date and the delivery of the policy. . . . [I]n all such cases, however, the policy
must . . . be construed as insurance of a risk, not as a certain agreement to pay ...
Thus in a marine policy, though the loss may have in fact occurred, the fact is
unknown, and there is the same aleatory element in the promise as though it might
occur in the future. . . .[T]he element of some chance is a condition to the promise
of the insured, and, if that element does not exist, his promise is made under a
mistake of existing fact. It is of no consequence whether that fact be the actual
loss, in a case where the insurance is of future loss, or of the insured's knowledge of
the loss, in a case where the insurance is of an existing loss. In either case there
must be some uncertainty as to the loss, or else the presupposition upon which the
promise is made does not exist.
Compare with the opinion of the Texas Commission of Appeals in Alliance, note 20,

infra.
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The Texas Commission of Appeals completely failed to make this distinction and laid down broad dicta indicating that an insurance policy
may never protect against a loss that occurred prior to the making of
the contract. 20 The effect of this dicta was immediate. In several Texas
cases following Alliance, the judges made sweeping statements to the
effect that no insurance policy could protect property that was already
destroyed, with or without the knowledge of the parties. 21 No less a
jurist than Justice Norvell was swept up in the tide.2 2 While sitting
on the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in San Antonio, he was called
upon to decide whether recovery could be had on an automobile collision policy, when the auto was destroyed prior to the time when the
insured received a renewal policy. The learned Justice, relying on
Alliance, said a recovery was precluded by a public policy that would
inhibit the making or enforcement of an insurance contract in relation
to imaginary property, even where both parties so intend.23 True, an
occasional case contained statements to the contrary; but these cases
were ignored 24 or overruled.25 The state of the law by 1956 was such
that a federal court said: 20
20 Alliance Ins. Co. v. Continental Gin, 285 S.W. 257 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt
adopted):
Property in esse ... is the basis of a contract of or for fire insurance. A substantial element is the chance of loss. If either thing be absent (i.e., if there be no
property originally or chance of loss be precluded by the certainty incident to preoccurring fire), the insurance company is in the absurd position of freely offering to
pay a large and certain sum . . . if the insured will pay to it the comparatively
insignificant amount of the premium. . . . Stated another way: In consideration of
present payment by one party of the rate named, the other party agrees to pay a
larger sum if, and when, a contingency happens; if the contingency does not happen,
the one loses the small sum; if it does happen, the other loses a large sum . . . ;
and it is entirely nonpermissible to assume that the parties intended to make, or
did make, a contract requiring payment of the larger sum if either, or both, of them
knew that the contingency, nominally in future, had already occurred. When good
faith of both parties is assumed and the property does not exist, there is a mutual
mistake of fact as to the very subject matter of the agreement; if the . . . insured
knows of the previous destruction, there is present avoiding fraud. . . . [I]t is our
opinion that public policy would inhibit the making or enforcement of an insurance
contract in relation to imaginary property, even where both parties so intend.
21 United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Fife, 6 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1928,
writ dism'd); American Central Ins. Co. v. Hulen, 30 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft.
Worth 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 45 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932, jdgmt
adopted); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 215 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1948, no writ); Mallard v. Hardware Indemnity Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 216 S.W.2d 263
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ); see also U.S. Casualty Co. v. Rodriguez,
288 S.W. 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, writ ref'd).
22 Mallard v. Hardware Indemnity Ins. Co. of Minnesota, 216 S.W.2d 263 (rex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1948, no writ).
23 Id.
24 Schubert v. McLain & McLain, 27 S.W.2d 846 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1930, no
writ).
25Banker's Lloyds v. Montgomery, 45 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931),
rev'd 60 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, jdgmt adopted).
20 H. Schumacher Oil Works v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 239 F.2d 836, 841 (9th Cir.
1956); see also 4 APPLEMAN INS. LAW AND PRACTICE, § 2291, p. 145 (1941): "Texas has
held, however, that property in esse and a chance of loss are necessary elements of in-
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Clearly there can be no recovery on those policies . . . written
during the fire, whether as original or renewal policies, since such
contracts are against the public policy of Texas, even if both parties
are ignorant of the existence of the fire and even though all the
damage has not yet occurred.
With this background, it is not surprising that the court of civil
appeals would not enforce the contract in the principal case. 27 In
reversing the decision, the supreme court "rediscovered" the distinction between the fact of loss and the knowledge of loss. 28 In so doing,
the court has returned Texas to the mainstream of law in the United
States. Justice Walker could see no reason for not allowing antedated
policies. He recognized that the sine qua non of the insurance contract
-risk-is present, provided neither of the parties know of a loss that
has already occurred. Indeed, the court has gone a step further. In the
principal case, the insured knew of the loss at the time the contract
was entered into. Yet the court would not impute this knowledge to
the agent, finding no fraud or neglect on the part of the insured. The
court reasoned that since the insured believed he was already covered
and since he did not know an insurance contract for his benefit was
being made on the morning following the accident, his failure to notify
29
the agent was neither fraudulent nor negligent.
The logic of the court is perhaps best tested by considering the effect
of an opposite decision. The enviable position in which such a decision
would put the insurance company was recognized by Justice Vredenburgh in Hallock v. Commercial Ins. Co.: 30
[The insurance company] . . . intentionally made the year's risk
commence from the 10th . . . . [T]hey . . . elected to take the
premium from the 10th. They took their pay for the very time
surance, and . . . no valid contract of insurance can be made unless the property is in
being at that time."
27 440 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969), rev'd, 450 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Sup.

1970).

28 Burch v. Commonwealth County Mutual Ins. Co., 450 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Sup. 1970).
29 Id. at 841. The court cites as authority Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Tacke, 257 F.2d
342 (9th Cir. 1958) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 256, Comment "e" (1957).
The RESTATEMENT provides:

A transaction is not affected by the knowledge of a principal which he cannot communicate to the agent, even though he knows that the agent is acting for him without such knowledge. It is only where the principal consciously or negligently fails
to communicate with the agent that his knowledge affects the transaction. This is
true whether the knowledge is acquired casually or is the result of a notification
given by the other party to the transaction.
Several other insurance cases also support this proposition. See Pendergast v. Globe &
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 159 N.E. 183 (N.Y. Sup. 1927); Andrews v. Marine Ins. Co., 4 N.Y.
Com. L. R. 656 (N.Y. Sup. 1811); M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Peters) 170,
7 L. Ed. 98 (1828); Cornfoot v. Fowke, 151 Eng. Rept. 450 (1840); see also VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, § 66 (3d ed., 1951).
90 26 N.J. 268, 275 (1857).
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